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West Indies Cave Hill Campus, Barbados, E-mail pmcconney@caribsurfcom
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ASTRACI' Does ''managing large pelagic fishes" mean the same thing across the diversity of maritime jurisdictions, governance arrangements, economies, languages, cultures, scales of operation and other features of the Gulf
and Caribbean region? It would be surprising if it did. Yet international fisheries management urges this mosaic of
management to become a melting pot; at least integrated, even if differentiated. This paper examines some themes
underlying whether a mosaic or melting pot is the most apt metaphor for where we are, and are headed, in attempts
to manage large pelagic fishes in the region. We pay particular attention to the multi-dimensional concept of scale.
Included are the scales of management units, fisheries authorities, management outcomes, harvest and postharvest
enterprises, and the interdisciplinary perspectives that can be brought to bear on fishery problems and solutions.
We are also interested in linkages, because linkage is connected to the scaling-up that is important in a region with
many small countries and territories. Even if the management of large pelagics starts as a mosaic, coherent patterns
of sub-regional and regional interactions can conceivably be nested and linked to improve the integration, and hence
effectiveness, of management interventions ... at least in theory.

RESUMEN Significa "Manejo de grandes peces pelagicos" 10 mismo a traves de la diversa jurisdicci6n marina,
arreglos de gobemabilidad, economias, lenguajes, culturas, escalas de operaci6n y otras caracteristicas de la regi6n
del Golfo y el Caribe? Sena sorprendente si asf fuera. Sin embargo el manejo intemacional de pesca sugiere que
este mosaico de manejo regional se convierta en un crisol de razas; por 10 menos estar integrado, aunque sea de
manera diferenciada. Este escrito examina algunos de los temas subyacentes para determinar si mosaico 0 un
crisol de razas es la m8S apta metMora para indicar donde estamos, y haeia donde vamos, en nuestro intento por
manejar grandes peces pe18.gicos dentro de la regi6n. Ponemos atenci6n particular al concepto multi-dimensional de
"esca1a". Incluidas est8:n las esca1as de unidades de manejo, autoridades de pesca, resultados de manejo, empresas
para cosecha y post cosecha las de perspectivas disciplinarias e inter disciplinarias que puedan aplicarse a los
problemas y soluciones de la pesca. Estamos igua1mente interesados en enlaces, ya que e1 enlace esta conectado al
aumento a escala que resulta importante dentro de una regi6n con muchos pequefios paf'ses y territorios. Aunque
e1 manejo de grandes pe18.gicos empiece como un mosaico, patrones coherentes de interacciones sub-regionales y
regionales pueden concebiblemente anidarse y en1azarse a fin de mejorar la integraci6n, y por ende la efectividad,
de intervenciones de manejo ... por 10 menos en teona.

(CARICOM) have harmonized their national fisheries regulations for demersal inshore and turtle species, and may
yet do so for large pelagics. Major importing countries
insist that their Caribbean suppliers meet international fish
trade and quality standards (e.g., Hazard Analysis Critical
Control Point systems, European Union Import Standards
for Fish Products) that extend backwards along the fish
chain to small-scale harvest operations. However, despite
these forces of homogenization, there are other factors that
maintain heterogeneity and reinforce the dilIerences in the
fisheries and fisheries management regimes of the region.
These dilIerences include the sizes and capacities
of the fisheries management authorities, the scales of the
industry components (vessels, landing facilities, processing plants, etc.), the relative size and value of the commercial harvest, the values of recreational fisheries, the
institutional and governance relationships among resource
users or other stakeholders and managers, the capabilities
of fisheries research agencies, and more. The dilIerences

INTRODUCTION

Wedged between the continental Americas, the Gulf of
Mexico (GOM) and Caribbean Sea contains more than 100
million people located in over 30 countries and territories,
the majority of which are islands. It would be surprising
if "managing large pelagic fishes" meant the same thing
across the diversity of maritime jorisdictions, governance
arrangements, economies, languages, cultures, scales of
operation and other features that reflect the heterogeneity
of the GOM and Caribbean Sea. Yet international fisheries
management trends urge this diverse mosaic to become a
melting pot; at least integrated in its management regimes,
even if dilIerentiated to some extent.
For example, the International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Thnas (ICCAT) recommended
management measures for large pelagic fishes are typically intended to be unifonuly applied in the area. Some
countries in alliances such as the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States (OECS) and the Caribbean Community
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fitting humans into ecosystem models or adding natural
resource dynamics to models of human society. The SES
view emphasizes that social and ecological systems are
inevitably linked and integrated, and that the delineation
between the 2 systems is artificial and arbitrary (Berkes
and Folke 1998, Anderies et al. 2006).
Scale is a concept common to most disciplines. SES
operate at multiple scales so it is critical to consider
the scale or range of scales at which we can collect and
process information, reach conclusions on and manage
effectively; ecological scales are both spatial and temporal.
Social scales also include the jurisdictional and institutiooal, among others. Integrated into an SES perspective,
complex and dynamic interactions and feedback loops
may occur within or across ecological and social scales
(Cununing et al. 2006).
Using the scheme of Cash et al. (2006), "scale" is
the overall label of the feature being measured such as
spatial, temporal, jurisdictional, institutional, management
arrangements, network, and ecological knowledge scales.
"Level" is the particular resolution within a scale. "Multiscale" means more than one scale. and "cross-scale"
signifies interactions across them. "Cross-level" refers to
interactions among different levels within the same scale
(Figure 1).
In Figure I, considering a hypothetical Caribbean
fisheries example, one may have an international fisheries
instrument with international jurisdiction (such as the FAO
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries) that drives
fisheries policy at the sub-regional (e.g., eastern Caribbean)
and country (e.g., St. Vincent and the Grenadines) levels.
This is multi-scale, cross-scale and multi-level. The international instrument also drives policy at the national jurisdictional level (cross-level). In this example, because of
vessel flagging practices, national jurisdictioo may extend
well beyond the geographic borders of the country. All of
the above may be top-down (shown by descending unidirectional arrows), but at lower levels in this multi-scale
case there are two-way interactions between watershed
and settlement as fisheries is integrated intu coastal management according tu the FAO Code. There are also orgauizational interactioos such as of the Fisheries Division
with communities (e.g., village council jurisdictioo) and
individnals (who have personal social networks) for getting the Code implemented.
Three common "scale challenges" include: the failure
to recognize important scale and level interactions altogether (ignorance); persistence of mismatches between
levels and scales (mis-match); and failure to recognize heterogeneity in the way that scales are perceived and valued
by different actors (Plurality)(Cash et al. 2006). In natural

are reflected in the approaches to fisheries management,
the inputs and outcomes, and they apply to all parts of the
fish chain in both private and public enterprise.
In the management of large pelagic fishes in the region
there will always be pros and cons as to whether complete
uniformity (extreme melting pot) is more desirable than
high diversity (extreme mosaic) or the reverse, or some
middle ground. The conclusion will often be situation
(fishery, management measure, country, stakeholder, etc.)
specific. Leveling the playing field through standardization (from reporting procedures to technical regulations)
may be equitable under some circumstances, but be highly
inequitable in others where the capacity to mange differs significantly among fishery participants. However,
regardless of whether or not industry and management
diversity is considered "good" or ''bad,'' fisheries managers and other stakeholders should be aware of what factors
maintain or erode diversity to greater and lesser extents.
Without this knowledge it will be difficult tu engineer any
planned degree of integration which is an important ingredient in maintaining the mosaic without much mixing or
stirting the melting pot to achieve the best blend.
This paper exantines some of the themes underlying whether ''mosaic'' or ''melting pot" is the most apt
metaphor for where we are, and are headed, in attempts
to manage large pelagic fishes in the region through various means of integration. We pay particular attention to
the multi-dimensional concept of scale because it is pervasive in the region. We are also interested in linkages
through networks, because linkage determines whether or
not scaling-up is feasible. The scaling up of management
can be desirable in a region with many small developing
countries and tetrituries that rely heavily 00 project-implemented fisheries management. Following the introduction
of what we mean by scale and network, these concepts are
applied in some brief analyses of fisheries in the GOM and
Caribbean Sea region. We attempt to provide unconventional and provocative perspectives on these topics, tu see
how well the metaphors fit the situations and to draw some
conclusioos from the findings.
Scale and Network Concepts
The concepts of scale and networks, for the purpose
of this discussion, are best addressed in the context of
fisheries governance as a complex adaptive system (CAS)
and social-ecological system (SES) (Garcia et al. 2003,
Bavinck et al. 2005, Kooiman et al. 2005, Wilson 2006).
CAS are highly interactive internally, and often exhibit the
capacity to self-organize and adapt without outside influence (Mahoo 2005). SES are conceptualized as being far
more intricately interwoven than is achieved by simply
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Figure 1. Spatial, jurisdictional and network multi·level scales showing cross·scale and cross·levellinkages (Based on Cash et
aI. 2006). Single headed arrows indicate unidirectional action (such as top·down influence) while double headed arrows indicate
two-way interaction (sueh as negotiation).

resource management systems, social-ecological scale
mismatches are evidenced by losses of adaptive capacity and resilience (Cumming et al. 2006). Successful comanagement institutions provide examples of approaches
to scales and linkages that address cross-scale governance
issues (Berkes 2002, 2006). TIris brings us to networks.
In the context of this paper, network analysis focuses
on the interactions between SES components and the ways
in which the structure of nodes and links, and the flows
contained within, affects the performance of the system on
a variety of scales at various levels. Network analysis has
been applied to both social systems and ecological systems, combining qualitative and quantitative information,
but seldom integrating SES (but see Janssen et al. 2006).
Network architecture or structure is of little value unless
the nature of flows through the network and its purpose
are also known. For example, a dense network may be
good for the rapid diffusion of a beneficial innovation or
information, but it may also spread irresponsible fishing
methods or constrain individual fisheries managers from
experimentation for adaptation if close-knit cliques are
formed.
Depending on the type of analysis (food web, community, fishery, business) network nodes can be individuals,
organizations, countries or whatever entities are appropriate. The focus on ties (relations between the focal node and

other nodes) and links (relations only between other nodes
in the focal node's network) as the main features that confer network properties, rather than the nodes themselves,
is distinctive to network analysis. Ties and links between
nodes may be characterized in innumerable ways. In
social network analysis the strengths and directions of the
flows of information, assistance, funds, conflict and other
types of exchanges are quantified and described. Although
networks are often illustrated 2-dimensionally as flat
structures, adding a third dimension or height can display
differences in levels within a scale, disparities in power
and other variations which may be perceived as ineqnitable
or otherwise problematic, and hence attract management
attention (Figure 2).
Figure 2 depicts a hypothetical personal social network with a longline captain (LLC) as the focal node. His
network contains his crew (LLF), the boat owner (BO) and
fisheries officials of various ranks. The most powerful of
the latter is the Chief Fisheries Officer (CFO) with whom
there is only a top-down relationship. Communication
with the CFO requires the captain to go through his boat
owner and a fisherfolk leader (FFL), or he can speak to
one of the lower ranked fisheries officials (DC or SFO).
Typically, hierarchical public administration is illustrated
by the links between the fisheries officials. We now tum
to how scale, linkage and network concepts are applicable
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tourism. There is considerable spatial and seasonal heterogeneity in marine productivity and oceanographic features
(Mahon 2002). In terms of ecological linkages, the trophic
connections between productive coastal areas and less productive offshore planktouic or pelagic systems are poorly
understood for this region. Food chain linkages between
exploited resources with differing scales of distribution
and migration through the EEZs or across the high seas,
such as flyingfish and large pelagics, have not received
much consideration in management. However, supporting
research is currently in progress. Knowing such Unkages
may be critical to preventing the stock depletion that has
occurred in many other areas and systems where predatorprey relationships have not been adequately considered in
the exploitation oflarge pelagic species (Mahon 2005).
A second, but patchier, mosaic layer superimposed
on these EEZs comprises the various organizations and
alliances to which the countries and territories in the
region belong. The spatial scales of the organizations
can be illustrated by highlighting their membership.
This is also shown in Figure 3 for CARICOM countries, but there are several other organizations relevant
to large pelagic fisheries including the Westem Central
Atlantic Fishery Commission (WECAFC) of the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), OECS and Organizaci6n
del Sector Pesquero y Acufcola del Istrno Centroamericano
(OSPESCA) among others (Chakalall et al. 1998, 2007).
It is immediately obvious that this patchwork of marine
jurisdictions and organizations poses serious challenges to
the integration of fisheries management in the region, and
especially so in the case oflarge pelagics that range beyond
the region (Singh-Renton et al. 2003). Spatial (ecological)
and jurisdictional (management) scales are generally not
well matched at any level, and this is well known (Mahon
and McConney 2004a). However, little attention has been
paid to the lower levels on the spatial and jurisdictional
scales and how these are linked to the higher levels. An
exception is the analysis by Berkes (2006) of tuna management in the eastern Caribbean within the context of crossscale govemance (Figure 4). He argued that international,
regional, uational and community levels are mis-matched
and poorly linked. He goes on to point out that this is also
true for the scales of power and knowledge seldom considered in management.
Using the case of small-scale fishers in Gouyave,
Grenada, it has been shown that their local fishery knowledge has no way of making an impression on the complex
science used in ICCAT assessments (Grant and Berkes
2004, Grant and Rennie 2005). ICCAT wields immense
power that affects the livelihoods of artisanal longline
fishers and constrains their opportunities. The impacts of
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Figure 2. Network of fishery stakeholders with power level
bierarchy superimposed CFO = Cbief Fisheries Officer; SFO
= Senior Fisheries Officer; FO = Fisheries Officer; DC =
Data CoUector; FFL = Fisherfolk leader; DO = boat owner;
LLC = loogline captain (the network node here); LLF = longUne fisher. Arrows denote communication with direction(s)
indicated, soUd for ties aod dotted for Unks. Dashed Unes in
triangle define three different levels of power. State stakeholders are shown as oval shapes and industry stakeholders
in rectangotar boxes.
to the management of large pelagic fishes in the GOM and
Caribbean.
Fisheries perspectives
In the GOM and Caribbean, large pelagic fishes are
the targets and by-catch of commercial, recreational and
subsistence fisheries that range from large scale to very
small scale. The species and species groups we refer to are
primarily the large tunas, billfishes, swordfish, dolpbinfish,
wahoo and large mackerels. Sharks are often included
as by-catch. The most recent information on the status
of stocks and fishery assessments is from ICCXI' (www.
iccat.int). However, although stock status, fishery trends
and regulatory measures are clearly pertinent to management, they are not the main focus of this paper. Instead,
we examine some of the practical consequences that scale,
Unkage and integration have for management, by means of
brief examples mainly from a CARICOM perspective.
The mosaic aspects of wider Caribbean geography
are conspicuous in the illustration of marine jurisdictions comprising hypothetical Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs) based on the principle of equidistance (Figure 3).
This jurisdictional mosaic consists of 26 countries and the
19 dependent territories of 4 other countries; the majority
of these countries and territories are small island developing states (SIDS) with high dependence on fishing and
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gain a much better appreciation of how large pelagic fishes
are managed, or not managed, and make meaningful inputs
into tbe Barbados perspective and policy on management.
Although all cannot be blamed on tbe absence of a single
officer, the very limited capacity of the fisheries authority
to engage the industry has severely constrained integration
at national and higher levels.
For a fuller explanation of constraints on integration
at the national level we also need to look beyond the management authority and examine the linkages to policy decision-making and to fisherfolk collective action as interest
or pressure groups. Policy-making and constitnent lobbying are closely related in political processes. Although
large pelagic fisheries are currently or potentially impor-

tant to the societies and economies of most CARICOM
countries (Mahon and McConney 2004a), tbese fisberies
seem to be of limited political interest and do not attract
the attention of ministers responsible for fisheries. Again
taking Barbados as an example, large pelagics dominate
foreign exchange earnings from fisheries through export
of tunas and swordfish. The scale of fishing is small, but
larger than what was described above for Grenada. Yet few
linkages exist between the industry and fisheries authority
that assist in empowering the latter successfully to pursue
policy decisions and to build management capacity to participate more effectively in ICCAT. Because the industry
shows no interest in ICCAT, and because large pelagics
are not very prominent icons in local fisheries cultore,
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the Fisheries Division is unlikely to be able to attend its
meetings or to obtain annnal budgetary allocations for
improving research or management. This contrasts sharply
with the fisheries for flyingfish and sea urchins in which
cultural and popular aspects are prominent and these
fisheries receive a considerable amount of attention from
policy decision-makers. The lesson here is not to underestimate the importance of local politics, power and culture
in fisheries management. If managers wish large pelagics
to attract the attention of policy-makers to management
issues, they may have to focus first on increasing interest
among their constituents.
These constituents include fisherfolk organizations
that are typically too weak and poorly organized to act
collectively as interest or pressure groups, resulting in
dependence on a few key individnals. Such persons may be
involved in the harvest, processing, marketing, distribution
and trade of large pelagics. Some may be members of fisherfolk organizations such as associations and cooperatives,
but in CARICOM countries most of these groups are rooted in the harvest rather than postharvest sector. Significant

proportions of the large pelagics landed in most countries
are purchased and exported by private or public sector
companies that tend to be individualistic rather than integrated in a postharvest organization. Also, as the scale and
capital investment of fishing enterprises increase, non-fishing vessel owners may be less inclined to be in fisherfolk
organizations since wealth is often accompanied by power
and socio-economic status. As such, their individnal interests can be met without organizational affiliation. Hence
collaborative relationships are likely to be much stronger
among fisher captains and crew than among boat owners and persons in postharvest. Social networks are often
important assets in coping with the uncertainties of fishing even more than formal organizations are (McConney
1997). Therefore, strategically, fisheries authorities should
aim to link with influential fishers of large pelagics in
order to pass on communications conceming the management of the industry. If social networks are dense, then
the diffusion of information can be fast and extensive
with these captains acting as nodes. If fisheries authorities
have an appreciation of social network structure, and the
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ICCAT (e.g., dolphinfish, wahoo, blackfin tuna), perhaps
under some type of inter-agency cooperation agreement.
Io the management of the postharvest sector, the
small-scale fishing industries have learned about ICCAT
through some of the trade reqnirements such as swordfish
certificates of eligibility to reduce the harvest, or at least
the landing and export, of undersized fish. Many fishers
in the eastern Caribbean are also aware of the trade and
conservation issues associated with bluefin tuna that complicate their rare incidental catches of these prized animals.
It is possible that more is known about the conservation
and management of large pelagics through the practice
of trade than thmugh the dissemination of information on
harvest regulations such as size limits and quotas. Io the
case of trade, the US market and that country's adherence
to ICCAT management measures have tended to integrate
management across exporting countries thmugh business
networks.
Caribbean commercial fishers are becoming increasingly knowledgeable about the rules and restrictions
governing recreational fishing, and are aware of how
recreational lobbyists have reduced or excluded commercial harvests in some places and fisheries in the USA.
For anglers, many gamefishing clubs will be made aware
by an organization such as the Iotemational Game Fish
Association (IGFA) of current responsible fishing practices such as tag and release and size limits (Antia et al.
2000). Thurnament anglers travel to fish under the rules in
other countries more often than commercial fishers since
there are no access agreements covering large pelagics in
the CARICOM region. From a network perspective there
are strong counections among anglers as a community of
interest. The connections between the gamefishing bodies and national fisheries authorities, and between anglers
and commercial fishers, are likely to be fewer and weaker
(Fignre 5).
This network information is pertinent to initiatives
such as that of The Billfish Foundation to improve conservation in the region. Knowing the linkages facilitates
directing effort and information to where success is most
likely.

flows within them, it is possible for them to be used instrumentally in fisheries management to increase the degree
of integration. Longline fishers are known to have transboundary networks for information exchange and assistance at sea that span much of the south-eastern Caribbean
(A. Kinch, Barbados longline fisher, pers. comm.). These
informal fisher networks are likely to be more efficient
for transmitting information than any official national or
regional system of communication.
The recent initiative of CARICOM leaders to strengthen and deepen regional integration by establishing a single
market and economy to replace the common market may
have significant implications for the management of large
pelgics and other shared species. The intentions of this
initiative are to: I) fully integrate and liberalize the internal
markets and economies of CARICOM States to facilitate
the structored integration of production of goods and services; 2) facilitate the unrestricted movement of capital,
labour and technology; and 3) allow access by nationals
to the collective resources of the region on a non-discriminatory basis (CARICOM 2002). The common fisheries
policy being developed as part of this process is designed
to give effect to these general objectives while ensuring
effective conservation and management of the fisheries
resources.

Another related integration initiative that may become
relevant to the management oflarge pelagics is the CRFM's
project to strengthen and link local and national fisherfolk
organizations into a regionally networked system. If this
initiative is successful, it may be more feasible for fisherfolk organizations to participate in fisheries management
through the bodies of the CRFM such as the Caribbean
Fisheries Forum that addresses policy advice and the
Large Pelagics Working Group (LPWG) that was set up in
2000 to conduct and contribute to fishery assessments. To
date the LPWG has functioned as a loose network mainly
of individnals who are responsible for data management
in national fisheries authorities and who share information just prior to the CRFM science meetings in order to
determine and report on fishery and resource trends. These
assessments have been assisted by scientists from outside
the region (UK and USA) thereby creating brief additional
linkages. A weakness in the LPWG networking is, however, that the inter-sessional activities, linkages and communications are not well developed; a constraint related again
to the limited capacities of buth the CRFM Secretariat and
its Member State fisheries authorities. This working group
is in urgent need of strengthening if the CRFM is to have
a stronger presence at ICCAT and if it aspires to becoming the regional fisheries management urganization for the
pelagic species that are not of great immediate interest to

Of mosaics and melting pots
The brief analysis presented here strungly suggests
that large pelagics reqnire more attention from fisheries
managers in the region, but the managers also need new
tools and perspectives to improve their chances of successful management. The mosaic metaphor sets a scenario
in which the entities are poorly connected or integrated
and attempts to scale up will be confronted by many
boundaries and barriers. The melting pot suggests strong
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integration while maintaining some dllferentiation or
recognizable diversity with few obstacles to scaling up. In
the GOM and Caribbean the management of large pelagic
fishes is extremely weak and is still mostly a mosaic (little
integration) with some areas that are melting pots (stronger integration) such as among OECS and CARICOM
Member States.
Informal linkages among fishers and linkages related
to fish trade or recreational fisheries seem to be better
developed than more fonnal linkages among management bodies and between them and either policy-makers or fisherfolk. A critical area for future management
research could be the characterization of fisher social networks. Regarding the "scale challenges," in the GOM and
Caribbean, there is little ignorance about issues of scale,
but there are scale mis-matches and plurality issues. These
need to be urgently addressed if the management of large
pelagic fishes is to be improved, integrated and scaled up
where possible.
Not all aspects of these problems can be tackled
simultaneously. It is necessary to identify critical areas for
integration and detennine what needs to be scaled up since
fisheries authorities will remain constrained by limited
capacity in relation to their areas of responsihility, at least
in CARICOM countries. Use of complex adaptive systems
concepts such as scale and networks in interdisciplinary
fisheries research gnided by social-ecological systems
perspectives will help to create new views for fishery
managers. Managers and researchers need to draw more
upon emerging social science and management theory to
address the human dimensions of management and to deal
with the pervasiveness of constraining power dynamics
and coullict in the management of large pelagic fishes.
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